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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
interest."' 5 Provisions of the lease agreement are not set forth
in the opinion.
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
MARRIAGE, SEPARATION, AND DIVORCE'
The attempts of a husband to have his wife committed to an
institution, or his use of "deceit and physical force" in attempting
to confine her, do not amount to cruelty warranting separation
from bed and board unless the action is taken without probable
cause. This is the conclusion in Kalpakis v. Kalpakis.2 The court
reasoned that in some instances it may be the duty of a spouse
to seek the commitment or confinement of the other, and that
often a person in need of mental treatment must be tricked or
forced to accept it. Consistent with this view, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff's petition failed to state a cause of action
because it did not affirmatively allege the unjustifiable character
of the defendant's conduct. The case is a novel one in Louisiana,
but there should be no doubt that such conduct, if actually unjusti-
fiable, constitutes cruelty under the jurisprudence applying
Article 138 of the Civil Code.'
Eals v. Swan4 affirmed the judicial practice of applying the
doctrine of comparative rectitude in separation and divorce cases.
In our jurisprudence, as the decisions cited in the Eals case show,
our legislation allowing divorce or separation for cause has been
regarded as measures "for the relief of the oppressed party," and
judgments have not been rendered in favor of either in instances
in which each party has given cause to the other and neither can
15. Id. at 67.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Decisions treating of questions of fact or settled legal questions relat-
ing to marriage, separation, or divorce and not discussed herein are Succes-
sion of Allen, 220 La. 365, 56 So. 2d 577 (1951)-proof of marriage, require-
ments for putative marriage; Meyer v. Hackler, 219 La. 750, 54 So. 2d 7
(1951)-standard of proof and sufficiency of evidence of adultery and recon-
ciliation, and reconventional demands in divorce and separation suits; and
Massa v. Thompson, 220 La. 278, 56 So. 2d 422 (1952), Kieffer v. Heriard, 221
La. 151, 58 So. 2d 836 (1952), and Clay v. Clay, 221 La. 258, 59 So. 2d 182 (1952)
-evidence or proof of adultery.
2. 60 So. 2d 217 (La. 1952).
3. Extreme cases on what may be considered cruelty are Spansenberg v.
Carter, 151 La. 1038, 92 So. 673 (1922) and Moore v. Moore, 192 La. 289, 187 So.
670 (1939).
4. 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952).
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be said to have been principally at fault. Perhaps this reflects
too much of a tort psychology in matrimonial cases. If the ques-
tion in separation and divorce problems be one of the advisability
or inadvisability of continuing a personal relationship, it would
seem that genuine bilateral personal fault should increase rather
than decrease the justification for awarding a separation. There
being no specific legislation on the precise point, in future deci-
sions the court could easily refuse to follow the comparative
rectitude doctrine. The existence of a judicial custom or juris-
prudence constante covering this situation should not be an ob-
stacle, for this is not an area of law in which predictability of
result is of prime importance. Nor should a change in policy be
rendered difficult by the rule that the wife "who has obtained
the divorce," or who originally obtained a judgment of separa-
tion and who later is divorced following a period of nonreconcili-
ation, may claim alimony. 5 A judgment for separation or divorce
for the causes given by each party could be regarded as a judg-
ment against rather than for each. Nor should the determination
of who should have custody of the children present a problem, for
today this is always decided on the basis of the best interest of
the children.
In three decisions the Supreme Court showed strong deter-
mination not to permit existing marital relations to be disturbed
by a showing that a divorce previously obtained by one of the
parties is a nullity. In Rouse v. Rouse" the court refused to permit
a wife to challange the validity of a divorce obtained by her hus-
band in Mississippi in 1933, stating that by her later remarriage
she had acquiesced in that decree. In Wilson v. Calvin,7 after
first noting a "strong public policy" against disturbing subse-
quently acquired personal relationships, it went to great pains
to apply a jurisprudentially developed presumption of validity
to a judgment of separation later made the basis of a divorce. In
Salassi v. Salassi8 it refused to accept the existence and validity
of a Nevada judgment decreeing a divorce in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, though the defendant was ready to
do so, on the technical ground that it had not been proven in the
manner required by Article 752 of the Code of Practice. The
court noted, in addition, that to admit the validity of the decree
5. Art. 160, La. Civil Code of 1870, and La. R.S. 1950, 9:302.
6. 219 La. 1065, 55 So. 2d 246 (1951). This case is discussed further in the
Conflict of Laws section of this symposium.
7. 221 La. 451, 59 So. 2d 451 (1952).
8. 220 La. 785, 57 So. 2d 684 (1952).
[VOL. XIII
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
would imply the invalidity of the second marriage of the plaintiff.
In connection with this last case, it may be well to observe that
to accept parties' contentions as to the validity or invalidity of
divorce decrees without requiring proof thereof would be analo-
gous to allowing the plaintiff in a separation or divorce suit to
have judgment on the face of the papers where the defendant in
his answer admits the existence of the cause for divorce. The
policy which dictated legislation prohibiting the one would re-
quire the denial of the other.
ALIMONY
R.S. 9:301 provides that the wife against whom a judgment
of divorce has been rendered on the ground of two years separa-
tion in fact may nevertheless claim alimony if she has not been
at fault. In Moser v. Moser9 the husband contended the wife
could not be considered free from fault in separating from him if
she did not have cause for separation from bed and board under
Article 138 of the Civil Code. As proof that she did not have such
cause he cited a previous judgment against her in a suit for
separation she had filed against him on the grounds of habitual
intemperance and cruel treatment and noted that the acts of
which she then complained were the same as those which she
now alleged as excuse for her having left the common home. The
Supreme Court felt that proof "that the husband was not at fault
would not prove that the wife was at fault."' 0 The writer is
inclined to prefer the husband's view to that of the court, believ-
ing that a spouse should not be considered justified in abandoning
the common life, and therefore not without fault within the
meaning of R.S. 9:301, whenever he or she has not grounds for
demanding a separation from bed and board. If our legislation
sanctions a suspension of common life in certain instances only,
the implication is that it does not in others, and that in those
other situations the parties are to be expected to live together.
Furthermore, it would seem proper to say that the use of the
word "fault" in R.S. 9:301 and its antecedent legislation beginning
with Act 269 of 1916 must have been in the light of our then
existing concept of fault in separation cases or more explicit
language would have been adopted. In any event, the denial of
alimony in instances in which the wife would not have been able
9. 220 La. 295, 56 So. 2d 553 (1951).
10. The same approach seems implied in a second decision rendered last
term, Scott v. Scott, 221 La. 249, 59 So. 2d 179 (1952).
1953]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to obtain a separation from bed and board might have the salu-
tary effect of discouraging the continuance of some separations
in fact and thereby of avoiding the divorces which otherwise
would follow.
In Smith v. Smith," a decision rendered in the 1949-1950 term,
the Supreme Court interpreted Article 160 of the Civil Code to
mean that after divorce the total assets of the wife, both capital
and income, should be taken into consideration in determining
whether she is without "sufficient means for her maintenance"
and therefore entitled to alimony. Shortly after this decision was
reported in the advance sheets the defendant in Babin v. Babin 1
2
suddenly ceased paying the alimony awarded his wife under
a judgment of separation from bed and board. When ruled into
court he argued that under the decision in Smith v. Smith alimony
was not due the wife who had sufficient capital assets for her
maintenance, showed that his wife had reecived about five thou-
sand dollars in the partition of the community formerly existing
between them, and insisted he need not pay further alimony until
she proved the expenditure of these assets. The Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's judgment1 3 against the husband's
contention on the ground (as the writer reads the opinion) that
the amount of alimony properly awardable to the wife was not
an issue before the court in a rule to enforce payment due under
a judgment previously rendered and now final.' 4 There can be
no doubt of the correctness of such an opinion, for once an ali-
mony judgment becomes final and executory, the judgment debtor
may not be allowed to refuse performance simply because he
believes it to be an incorrect application of the law. The matter
is then res judicata.
The decision, however, suggests several interesting questions.
11. 217 La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32 (1950).
12. 220 La. 121, 55 So. 2d 888 (1951).
13. The reasons for the district judge's judgment are not given in the
Supreme Court's opinion.
14. Such is the writer's interpretation of the words "the . ..argument
Is .. . without merit. In the case of Smith v. Smith, supra, the husband was
contesting the wife's right to alimony, while in the instant case there was
no such contest; on the contrary, the husband acquiesced in the judgment
awarding alimony by stipulating in the act partitioning the community that
the defendant "shall pay to his wife, as alimony, the sum of $140 per month,
until such time as she should remarry, as set forth in the judgment of
separation from bed and board." It does not appear that the court considered
the agreement to pay alimony as anything more than evidence of the hus-
band's acceptance of the alimony judgment. Thus the case should not be
interpreted as implying that the existence of the contract prevented a
reopening of the alimony issue.
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The case involved alimony payable after separation from bed and
board, not alimony payable after divorce, as in the Smith case.
Are the criteria for determining the wife's need for alimony
after divorce applicable to determine the wife's need for alimony
after separation from bed and board? The standards announced
in the Smith decision are based on Article 160 of the Civil Code,
which reads in terms of the means of the wife, whereas alimony
after separation has been based on Article 148 of the Civil Code,
which reads in terms of the wife's income.15 Thus we may well
wonder whether the Supreme Court would apply the "capital
assets plus income" rule of the Smith case to a claim for alimony
after separation from bed and board. Nevertheless, an astute
commentator on our law, though avoiding the direct application
of either Article 148 or Article 160, has suggested that the same
criteria of the wife's need should be applied in both instances.1
This leads to the second question. Assuming that the criteria
sanctioned in the Smith case are applicable to determine the
amount of alimony after separation (or that the facts in the
Babin case involved alimony after divorce rather than after sep-
aration), is there any procedure which the defendant in the
Babin case could have followed to obtain a new judgment calcu-
lating his future obligation according to those standards? It is to
be noted that he would not have been seeking a redetermination
of his obligation because of a change in the circumstances of the
parties, as clearly permitted under Article 232 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, but because of an error of law committed by the court
when originally determining the extent of his liability. Would
res judicata be applicable here? It would seem a violation of
natural justice to refuse relief as to payments which would fall
due at a time when a different standard for liability would be
applied to new cases involving persons similarly situated. Cer-
tainly the alimony obligor would be entitled to a redetermination
15. Art. 148, La. Civil Code of 1870, literally applies to alimony pendente
lite, but has been extended to cover alimony after separation, concerning
which there is no specific legislative text. See Anzalone v. Anzalone, 182 La.
234, 161 So. 594 (1935) and Arnold v. Arnold, 186 La. 323, 172 So. 172 (1937).
16. Lazarus, What Price Alimony, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 401, 419 et
seq. (1951). The author suggests that (1) although there is no legislation
providing specifically for alimony after separation, (2) the parties are never-
theless still married, (3) the wife therefore is entitled to support and main-
tenance under Articles 119 and 120 of the Civil Code, and (4) the proper
standard is the general one prescribed in Article 231 of the Civil Code, under
which the "circumstances" as distinguished from the "income" of the person
demanding alimony must be considered.
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of his obligation if new legislation brought about the change in
standards of liability.
In Moser v. Moser17 the husband appealed from a judgment
ordering him to pay alimony to his wife, for herself and the child
in her custody, alleging the total amount exceeded one-third of
his income and therefore exceeded the limit of his liability as fixed
in Article 160 of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court correctly
upheld the order, noting that Article 160 limited the alimony pay-
able to the wife and for her benefit to one-third of the husband's
income, but did not so limit his total alimentary liability to his
wife and other persons. It would seem more consistent with our
legislation to make separate alimony awards for the wife and the
child, for the one's right is based on Articles 148 and 160, whereas
the other's is founded on Article 227 of the Civil Code. Actually
alimony for the wife should be made payable to her in her own
name, but alimony for the child should be made payable to the
wife who has its custody in her capacity as tutrix, for only the
tutor may receive funds owing to the child. It may even be sug-
gested that such practice would facilitate the proper filing of
income tax returns, for whereas the husband may deduct from
gross income alimony payable to and for the wife, he is entitled
to claim only a dependent's exemption for amounts payable to
a child.' 8
The decision in Uchello v. Uchello' 9 perpetuates an error of
law made in a 1925 alimony decision. During a suit for separation
and after judgment therein the husband paid alimony at a rate
which had been determined in a computation for the purposes of
which the revenues from community assets had been considered
as his income. At the time of the partition of the community, the
husband sought to deduct the total alimony so paid from the total
revenue derived from the community assets during the same
period. The lower court disallowed the deduction, apparently
believing that the husband's separate income was to be so charged,
but the Supreme Court allowed the deduction. It is submitted
that both courts were in error, and that the alimony should have
been deducted from the wife's share of the "community" revenues
during the same period.
If a judgment of separation or divorce dissolves the com-
munity as of the date of filing suit, then as of that date all assets
17. 220 La. 295, 56 So. 2d 553 (1951).
18. 26 U.S.C. §§ 22(k), 23(u), 25(D) (1946).
19. 220 La. 1061, 58 So. 2d 385 (1952).
[VOL. XIII
1953] WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT 259
formerly belonging to the community must be considered sep-
arate property owned in indivision by the spouses. From this, it
would follow that from the date of filing suit to that of the judg-
ment of separation or divorce the income from this property must
belong half to the husband and half to the wife as separate income.
As the wife's right to claim alimony from her husband pending
suit is reduced to the extent that she has income,20 it would seem
proper to permit the husband to deduct the alimony he pays pend-
ing suit from income of the wife for the same period which may
come into his hands.2 1 If the standard for alimony after separa-
tion is properly the same as that pending suit-and such has
been the view of the jurisprudence 2 2 -then the same rule should
apply for alimony paid during this period.2 3 This was the solu-
tion used in Hill v. Hil2 4 in 1905. But in 1925 White v. White ,25
though citing Hill v. Hill as authority, permitted the deduction of
the alimony payments from the total "community" revenue, and
it is this second decision which the Supreme Court followed in
Uchello v. Uchello.
That the error is a substantial one can be demonstrated by
an application of the two solutions to the facts of the instant case.
The total "community" income for the period during which ali-
mony was paid amounted to $6,800 and the alimony payments
totaled $3,600. If the wife had been charged with the full amount
of this alimony (as in Hill v. Hill) then it would have totally
consumed her $3,400 share of the revenue from the "community,"
and the husband's actual contribution as alimony for the period
20. Art. 148, La. Civil Code of 1870.
21. Another way of expressing this, and perhaps a better one, would be
to say that the husband's liability for alimony pending suit cannot exceed the
difference between the wife's income and her needs, and that if he is obliged
to pay alimony computed on the basis of his separate income plus income
in his hands properly belonging to the wife, whatever he must pay as alimony
should be considered payable first out of such income of the wife and only
after this Is exhausted out of his separate income. It should be clear that
the problem arises only because pending suit the wife does not actually have
control over some of the income for this period which later, if a separation
or divorce be granted, must be considered hers and not the husband's.
22. Arnold v. Arnold, 186 La. 323, 172 So. 172 (1937). See also note 15
supra, and text above it.
23. The above analysis is valid only so long as the wife's need is computed
according to the standard prescribed by Article 148 of the Civil Code.
Certainly a different rule should be applied in cases involving alimony paid
under Article 160 of the Civil Code, for under that article as interpreted in
Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32 (1950), the wife's capital assets as
well as her income determine her means and therefore relative lack of need.
(See the discussion under Babin v. Babin, 220 La. 121, 55 So. 2d 888 [1951], in
this Symposium, p. 256 above.)
24. 115 La. 490, 39 So. 503 (1905).
25. 159 La. 1065, 106 So. 567 (1925).
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would have amounted to only $200. On the other hand, by deduct-
ing the alimony payments from the "community" revenues, the
net revenues! of the "community" were reduced to $3,200, of which
each spouse finally received $1,600. Thus the wife was obliged to
use only $2,000 of her $3,400 income for the period for her sup-
port and the husband was made liable for $1,600 more than he
should have had to pay.
MINORS
26
Of considerable interest is the case of Ball v. Campbell,27
which held that the mother who has surrendered an illegitimate
child under Act 91 of 1942 may not, by the mere fact of her oppo-
sition, prevent the adoption of that child. The decision clearly
distinguished that in Green v. Paul,28 in which a surrender for
adoption not made under Act 91 of 1942 was deemed not to pre-
vent later effective parental opposition to the adoption. Act 91
of 1942 is no longer law, having been repealed and replaced by
the more inclusive Act 227 of 1948,29 but the decision is never-
theless important, for the language used in this legislation is more
forceful than that in Act 91 of 1942 so far as it relates to the sur-
render of an illegitimate child neither formally acknowledged nor
legitimated by the father. It should be noted, however, that the
court prefixed the substantial part of its decision with a remark
to the effect that, even if the mother has no right to prevent the
adoption of an illegitimate child after surrendering it, her oppo-
sition thereto should be considered with other factors in determin-
ing whether the adoption would be for the best interest of the
child.30
26. Three cases dealt with the proper evaluation of evidence in parental
disputes. over the custody of children. These cases are Ane v. Ane, 220 La.
345, 56 So. 2d 570 (1951); Kieffer v. Heriard, 221 La. 151, 58 So. 2d 836 (1952);
and Guillory v. Guillory, 221 La. 374, 59 So. 2d 424 (1952). Another decision,
not otherwise discussed here, is that of State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So. 2d
242 (1951), in which the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for Orleans parish
over children emancipated by marriage was upheld. The ground for the
objection thereto is not stated in the opinion, and it is difficult to see. R.S.
13:1570 and 13:1569(3), as they read since Act 82 of 1950, expressly give the
court such jurisdiction, and Article VII, Section 26 of the Constitution, as
amended pursuant to Act 513 of 1948, is certainly broad enough to authorize
the language used in that legislation.
27. 219 La. 1076, 55 So. 2d 250 (1951).
28. 212 La. 337, 31 So. 2d 819 (1947).
29. La. R.S. 1950, 9:401-405.
30. A second, but rather obvious, point in Ball v. Campbell was that the
six months' prescriptive period for attacking parental surrenders of children
under Act 91 of 1942, provided for in Act 227 of 1948, § 5 (La. R.S. 1950,
9:405), does not apply to attacks made on grounds not included in that
legislation.
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CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF FAMILY
Article 74 of the Criminal Code (R.S. 14:74) was amended by
Act 164 of 1950 to read in part:
"Criminal neglect of family is the desertion or intentional
non-support:
* * *
"(2) By either parent of his minor child, whether legi-
timate or illegitimate, who is in destitute or necessitous cir-
cumstances. Solely for the purpose of determining the obli-
gation to support, the court shall admit proof of paternity
or maternity, or both." 31
In State v. Randall32 the state sought to prove the alleged
actual father guilty under this article even though the child had
been born during the marriage of its mother to a man other
than the defendant. The Supreme Court applied the presump-
tions of legitimacy in Civil Code Articles 184-192, ruled the child
must be considered that of the husband of the mother, and
declared the statute inoperative as to the defendant, whether or
not the biological parent. In three later cases, however, State v.
Jones,33 State v. Sims, 34 and State v. Love,3 5 the Supreme Court
concluded that the article as amended could not be applied to
convict the alleged father of failure to support an illegitimate
child if his fatherhood had not been determined before the estab-
lishment of his failure so to support. The court based its conclu-
sions principally on these grounds: (1) that it is not possible to
charge a person with criminal neglect of another unless he had
an obligation to support that other before the act of neglect with
which he is charged; (2) that Article 74 of the Criminal Code as
amended in 1950 did not itself establish that obligation; and (3)
that no civil obligation to support illegitimate children exists
prior to the establishment of their filiation by acknowledgment
or proof of parentage. Whether or not the second and third points
are correct, and certainly there is room for argument here, one
can sympathize with the court's decisions. No matter how much
parents may neglect their children and how great may be the
31. This amendment and the cases mentioned in this section of the
Symposium are more fully treated in the Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
301 (1952).
32. 219 La. 578, 53 So. 2d 689 (1951).
33. 220 La. 381, 56 So. 2d 724 (1951).
34. 220 La. 532, 57 So. 2d 177 (1952).
35. 220 La. 562, 57 So. 2d 187 (1952).
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need for compelling them to perform their obligations, it is shock-
ing to think that one might be accused-and much more so, con-
victed-of crime for not supporting a child whose paternity he
might well have questioned. To permit a civil suit to establish
paternity and the duty to support, even for a period prior to the
suit, and to permit criminal prosecution for failure to support
once the obligation had been established would be quite different
things. This is not to say that the legislature cannot provide
otherwise, and unfortunately it has provided otherwise since
these decisions.3
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
AcQuIsITIvE PRESCRIPTION
The case of Ramsey v. Murphy' illustrates the usefulness of
the thirty-year prescription2 in providing stability for land titles
and in making unnecessary a probe concerning the actual validity
of very old transactions (which may very well have been per-
fectly good). Fifty years after the settlement of a succession, the
plaintiffs claimed an interest in property which once belonged
to their grandparents. In the settlement of the original suc-
cession, the property had been sold to pay debts and then it was
repurchased by another grandchild who lived on the property.
The latter fenced it in, paid taxes, sold timber, granted mineral
leases, and mortgaged the property, and then he conveyed it to
another, who continued the physical possession by himself and
through a tenant until the present suit. Without investigating
the plaintiff's charge of invalidity against the succession sale
and repurchase half a century. ago, the court held that by reason
of privity of contract, the present possession could be tacked on
to the preceding one, thereby making over thirty years since the
plaintiff's majority in 1917.3 Cases like this demonstrate force-
36. Act 368 of 1952, amending Criminal Code Article 74 (La. R.S. 14:74).
Under this amendment, there is no provision for the establishment of the
parenthood of the defendant when the civil law establishes a presumption of
legitimate paternity in another person. Thus the result which the state
sought to achieve in State v. Randall, 219 La. 578, 53 So. 2d 689 (1951), men-
tioned in the text above, is not possible under this amendment.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 220 La. 745, 57 So. 2d 670 (1952).
2. Art. 3499 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. This also eliminated any need to investigate the effects of the 1920 and
1924 amendments of Civil Code Art. 3478.
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